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1. MOTIVATION AND OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
The events of the last few years revealed an acute need
for tools to systematically model and analyze large finan-
cial networks. Many applications of such tools include
the forecasting of systemic failures and analyzing proba-
ble effects of economic policy decisions.
We consider the problem of optimizing the amount
and structure of a bailout in a borrower-lender network.
Two broad application scenarios motivate our work: day-
to-day monitoring of financial systems and decision mak-
ing during an imminent crisis. Examples of the latter
include the decision in September 1998 by a group of
financial institutions to rescue Long-Term Capital Man-
agement, and the decisions by the Treasury and the Fed in
September 2008 to rescue AIG and to let Lehman Broth-
ers fail. The deliberations leading to these and other sim-
ilar actions have been extensively covered in the press.
These reports suggest that the decision making processes
could benefit from quantitative methods for analyzing
potential repercussions of contemplated actions. In ad-
dition, such methods could help avoid systemic crises in
the first place, by informing day-to-day actions of finan-
cial institutions and governments.
Forecasting and preventing systemic failures is an
open problem, despite a surge in the research literature
during the last four years. There are two main difficulties.
First, the data on borrower-lender relationships and capi-
tal structure of financial institutions is largely unavailable
to academic researchers. Even the data available to reg-
ulators is far from exhaustive and perfect. Second, the
network of financial relationships is very large, complex,
and dynamic.
Given a financial network model, we are interested in
addressing the following problem.
Problem I: Given a fixed amount of cash C to
be injected into the system, how should it be dis-
tributed among the nodes in order to achieve the
smallest overall amount D of unpaid liabilities?
An alternative, Lagrangian, formulation of the same
problem, is to both select C and determine how to dis-
tribute it in order to minimize C + λD, where λ is the
cost associated with every dollar of unpaid liabilities. In
this formulation, λ can be used to model the trade-off
between the costs of a bailout (direct costs as well as
moral hazard) and the costs of defaults.
In this work, we consider a static model with a sin-
gle maturity date, and with a known network structure.
Specifically, we assume that we know both the amounts
owed by every node in the network to every other node,
and the amounts of cash available at every node. Even
for this relatively simple model, Problem I is far from
straightforward, because of a nonlinear relationship be-
tween the cash injection amounts and the loan repayment
amounts. Building upon the results from [2], we con-
struct algorithms for computing exact solutions for Prob-
lem I and its Lagrangian variant, by showing that both
formulations are equivalent to linear programs.
We also consider another problem where the objec-
tive is to minimize the number of defaulting nodes rather
than the overall amount of unpaid liabilities:
Problem II: Given a fixed amount of cash C to
be injected into the system, how should it be dis-
tributed among the nodes in order to minimize the
number of nodes in default, Nd?
For Problem II, we develop an approximate algorithm
using a reweighted `1 minimization approach inspired
by [1]. We illustrate our algorithm using an example with
synthetic data for which the optimal solution can be cal-
culated exactly, and show through numerical simulation
that the solutions calculated by our algorithm are close to
optimal.
In Section 2 we describe our model and the results
from prior literature that we use. Our own results—the
equivalence of Problem I to a linear program and the
approximate algorithm for Problem II—are described in
Section 3.
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Table 1. Notation for several vector quantities
VECTOR i-TH COMPONENT
0 0
1 1
e ≥ 0 cash on hand at node i
c ≥ 0 external cash injection to node i
p¯ the amount node i owes to all its
creditors
p ≤ p¯ the total amount node i actually re-
pays all its creditors on the due date
of the loans
p¯− p node i’s total unpaid liabilities
q the total amount node i actually re-
ceives from all its borrowers
r = q+ e+ c the total funds available to i for
making payments to its creditors
2. NOTATION, MODEL, AND BACKGROUND
Our network model is a directed graph with N nodes
where a directed edge from node i to node j with weight
Lij > 0 signifies that i owes $Lij to j. This is a one-
period model with no dynamics—i.e., we assume that all
the loans are due on the same date and all the payments
occur on that date. We use the following notation:
• any inequality whose both sides are vectors is
component-wise;
• 0, 1, e, c, p¯, p, q, and r are all vectors in RN
defined in Table 1;
• D = 1T (p¯ − p) is the overall amount of unpaid
liabilities in the system;
• Nd is the number of nodes in default, i.e., the num-
ber of nodes i whose payments are below their lia-
bilities, pi < p¯i;
• Πij is what node i owes to node j, as a fraction of
the total amount owed by node i,
Πij =
{
Lij
p¯i
if p¯i 6= 0,
0 otherwise;
• Π and L are the matrices whose entries are Πij and
Lij , respectively.
Following [2], we make the following assumptions.
• If i’s total funds are at least as large as its liabilities
(i.e., ri ≥ p¯i) then all i’s creditors get paid in full.
• All i’s debts have the same seniority. This means
that, if i’s liabilities exceed its total funds (i.e.,
ri < p¯i) then each creditor gets paid in proportion
to what it is owed. This guarantees that the amount
actually received by node j from node i is always
Πijpi. Therefore, the total amount received by any
node i from all its creditors is qi =
∑N
j=1 Πjipj .
As defined in [2], a clearing payment vector p is a vec-
tor of borrower-to-lender payments that is consistent with
these conditions for given L, e, and c. It is shown in [2]
(Theorem 2) that a unique p exists for any network that
satisfies a mild technical assumption. We restrict our at-
tention to models that satisfy this assumption and there-
fore have a unique clearing payment vector p.
3. RESULTS
3.1. Minimizing the amount of unpaid liabilities
Consider a network with a known structure of liabilities
L and a known cash vector e. Using the notation estab-
lished in the preceding section, we can see that Problem I
seeks to find a cash injection allocation vector c to mini-
mize the total amount of unpaid liabilities,
D = 1T (p¯− p),
subject to the constraint that the total amount of cash in-
jection is some given number C:
1T c = C.
Our first result establishes the equivalence of Problem I
and a linear programming problem.
Theorem 1. Assume that the liabilities matrix L, the
cash-on-hand vector e, and the total cash injection
amount C are fixed and known. Assume that the network
satisfies all the conditions listed above. Then Problem I
has a solution which can be obtained by solving the
following linear program:
find c and p to maximize 1Tp (1)
subject to
1T c = C,
c ≥ 0,
0 ≤ p ≤ p¯,
p ≤ ΠTp+ e+ c.
Proof. Since the constraints on c and p in linear program
(1) form a closed and bounded set in R2N , a solution
exists. Moreover, for any fixed c, it follows from Lemma
4 in [2] that the linear program has a unique solution for
p which is the clearing payment vector for the system.
Let (p∗, c∗) be a solution to (1). Suppose that there
exists a cash injection allocation that leads to a smaller
total amount of unpaid liabilities than does c∗. In other
words, suppose that there exists c′ > 0, with 1T c′ = C,
such that the corresponding clearing payment vector p′
satisfies 1T (p¯− p′) < 1T (p¯− p∗), or, equivalently,
1Tp∗ < 1Tp′. (2)
Note that c′ satisfies the first two constraints of (1).
Moreover, since p′ is the corresponding clearing pay-
ment vector, the last two constraints are satisfied as well.
The pair (p′, c′) is thus in the constraint set of our linear
program. Therefore, Eq. (2) contradicts the assumption
that (p∗, c∗) is a solution to (1). This completes the
proof that c∗ is the allocation of C that achieves the
smallest possible amount D of unpaid liabilities.
In the Lagrangian formulation of Problem I, we are
given a weight λ and must choose the total cash injection
amount C and its allocation c to minimize C+λD. This
is equivalent to the following linear program:
find C, c, and p to maximize λ1Tp− C (3)
subject to the same constraints as in (1).
This equivalence follows from Theorem 1: denoting a so-
lution to (3) by (C∗,p∗, c∗), we see that the pair (p∗, c∗)
must be a solution to (1) for C = C∗. At the same time,
the fact that C∗ maximizes the objective function in (3)
means that it minimizes C + λD = C + λ1T (p¯ − p),
since p¯ is a fixed constant.
3.2. Minimizing the number of defaults
Given that the total amount of cash injection is C, Prob-
lem II seeks to find a cash injection allocation vector c to
minimize the number of defaults Nd, i.e., the number of
nonzero entries in the vector p¯− p.
We adapt the reweighted `1 minimization strategy ap-
proach from Section 2.2 of [1]. Our algorithm solves a
sequence of weighted versions of the linear program (1),
with the weights designed to encourage sparsity of p¯−p.
In the following pseudocode of our algorithm, w(m) is
the weight vector during the m-th iteration.
1. m← 0.
2. Select w0 (e.g., w0 ← 1).
3. Solve linear program (1) with objective function
replaced by pTw(m).
4. Update the weights: for each i = 1, · · · , N ,
w
(m+1)
i ←
K
exp
(
p¯i − p∗(m)i
)
+ 
,
where K > 0 and  > 0 are constants, and p∗(m)
is the clearing payment vector obtained in Step 3.
5. If ‖w(m+1) −w(m)‖1 < δ, where δ > 0 is a con-
stant, stop; else, increment m and go to Step 3.
Fig. 1. Illustration of the algorithm for Problem II.
We test the algorithm on a network for which we
know the optimal solution. We use a full binary tree with
10 levels and N = 210 − 1 nodes: levels 0 and 9 corre-
spond to the root and the leaves, respectively. Every node
at level s < 9 owes $210−s to each of its two creditors
(children). We set e = 0.
If C = 0, then all 511 non-leaf nodes are in default,
and the 512 leaves are not in default. In aggregate, the
nodes at any level s < 9 owe $2048 the nodes at level
s + 1. Therefore, if C ≥ $2048, then Nd = 0 can be
achieved by allocating the entire amount to the root node.
For 0 < C < 2048, we first observe that if C =
211−s for some integer s, then the optimal solution is
to allocate the entire amount to a node at level s. This
would prevent the defaults of this node and all its non-
leaf descendants, leading to 511− (29−s−1) defaults. If
C is not a power of two, we can represent it as a sum of
powers of two and apply the same argument recursively,
to yield the following optimal number of defaults:
Nd = 511−
U∑
u=3
b(u) · (2u−2 − 1),
where b(u) is the u-th bit in the binary representation of
C (right to left) and U is the number of bits. The green
line in Fig. 1 is a plot of the minimum number of defaults
as a function ofC. The blue line is the solution calculated
by our reweighted `1-minimization algorithm with K =
1000,  = 0.001 and δ = 0.001. The algorithm was
run using six different initializations: five random ones
and w(0) = 1. Among the six solutions, the one with
the smallest number of defaults was selected. As evident
from Fig. 1, the results are very close to the optimal for
the entire range of C.
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